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Motivation
• Left parties have often been viewed by economists (and 
general public) as less “business-friendly”
• Higher taxes (Alesina, 1987; Budge et al., 2001)
• Higher interest rates (Alesina and Rodrick, 1994; 
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Snowberg et al., 2007)
• Stringent labour regulation (Botero et al., 2004; Rueda, 
2005) 
• Strict environmental regulation (Shipan and Lowry, 
2005; Neumayer, 2004;  Budge et al., 2001)
Mixed Evidence
• Mixed academic evidence on the impact of partisanship 
on financial outcomes
• Santa Clara and Valkanov (2003, JF) – significantly higher stock 
returns under Democratic presidencies
• Jacobsen and Stangl (2007) – no presidential cycle in US 
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industry returns. 
• Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007, QJE) – higher equity 
prices, interest rates, and US dollar exchange rates under 
Republican presidencies
• Pinto and Pinto (2008) – under left governments, FDI inflows 
have a positive impact on wages
Motivation
• Lack of conclusive evidence is particularly puzzling given 
growing literature on the impact of political uncertainty on 
financial outcomes
Julio and Yook (2012, JF); Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and 
Molchanov (2012, RFS); Pastor and Veronesi (2011, JF)
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• There is a material impact of uncertainty regarding party 
orientation and policies
• However, no consistent evidence that firms perform worse 
under left governments
• Simple test: Compare ROAs in country-years of left and right 
governments
• No significant differences in performance
Motivation
•Why?
1. Not all firms are equally exposed to 
influence of ‘leftist’ policies
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2. Not all ‘leftist’ legislation is enacted 
under left governments
3. Much of the existing literature has 
relied in a ‘left-right’ dummy variable
Our Contribution
1. Explicitly account for the fact that not all industries are 
equally influenced by government partisanship
• Introduce several measures of ‘leftist’ sensitivities
2. Acknowledge the imperfect link between orientation of a 
ruling party orientation and actual policies
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• Perform a two-stage regression. Use policies explained by party 
orientation
3. Account for potential complexities of government 
structures (e.g., coalition governments, legislative and 
executive branches controlled by different parties)
• Create a novel party orientation index
Our Contribution
4. Perform the study in an international context
• Much of the evidence is based on US data
5. Address endogeneity between performance and party 
orientation
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 Aside from “standard” remedies for endogeneity, we create a 
novel instrument of party orientation – commodity resource 
endowment 
 High resource endowment prompts redistributive pressures, 
making left governments more likely
 Note that this instrument is time varying
Political Orientation Sensitivities
• We hypothesize that not all firms are equally affected 
by government ruling party orientation
• Concept of ‘political sensitivities’ has been utilized before. 
• Julio and Yook (2012) – more politically-sensitive industries 
experience sharper drop in investments in election years
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• Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, Molchanov (2012) – more labour-
intensive, trade-dependent, and contract-dependent industries 
have higher volatilities in times of high political risk
• Belo, Gala, and Li (2011) – industries more dependent on 
government purchases perform better under Democratic 
administrations
• Large lobbying literature (e.g., Coper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 
(2010) – stronger positive effect for firms contributing to 
Democrats)
Political Orientation Sensitivities 
(Contribution 1)
• We propose four economic channels of leftist policies 
transmission.
• Sensitivity to labour legislation
• Measured by firms labour intensity as value of labour inputs over the 
total value of production inputs. US data – extrapolated on other 
countries (Similar to the methodology of Rajan and Zingales, 1997, 
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AER).
• US labour laws are actually some of the most lax in developed world
• Sensitivity to tax legislation 
• Measured by EBIT/Sales. Local data.
• Sensitivity to interest rates
• Measured by leverage (Total debt/Total assets). US data – extrapolated 
on other countries.
Rajan-Zingales Approach
Left 
legislation
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Rajan-Zingales Approach
Left 
legislation
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Political Orientation Sensitivities -
Continued
• Four economic channels (continued):
• Sensitivity to environmental legislation
• Measured by environmental category of the Social Corporate 
Responsibility index compiled by MSCI ESG database. Canadian data –
extrapolated on other countries.
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• Canadian environmental laws are relatively lax
• Sensitivity approach reduces omitted variable bias, as 
industries are compared within each country
• Alternative sensitivities are certainly possible
Link Between Party Orientation and 
Policies (Contribution 2)
• It has been traditionally assumed that ‘left’ governments 
are associated with ‘leftist’ policies
• Botero et al, 2004; Rueda, 2005 – more stringent labour legislation. 
• Alesina and Rodrick (1997), among others – higher interest rates. 
• Alesina (1987) – higher taxes.
• Shipan and Lowry, 2001; Neumayer, 2004 – more stringent 
environmental laws.
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• However, left party orientation is not always a good 
predictor of ‘leftist’ legislation (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; 
Bobbio, 1996; Faust and Irons, 1999; Hibbs, 1977) 
• Our solution: employ two-stage least squares estimation 
and employ ‘leftist’ legislation explained (and 
unexplained) by party orientation
Link Between Party Orientation and 
Policies – Continued
• Strength of ‘leftist’ legislation measures are regressed on 
the measure of left party orientation
• Fitted values and residuals are collected and used in the second 
stage regression
• The following policy measures were employed:
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• Rigidity of employment legislation. Source: Doing Business Report 
(World Bank)
• Rigidity of environmental legislation. Source: IMD’s World 
Competitiveness Report
• Corporate tax rate. Source: World Bank
• 90-day real interest rates. Source: WDI (World Bank)
Party Orientation Definition (Contribution 3)
• Most of the existing literature relies on the indicator variable for 
left party orientation
• Currently, US ruling party would be classified as ‘left’, even though 
Congress is Republican
• Richer measures have been developed in political science 
(e.g., Woldendorp et al., 1993), but rarely applied in economics 
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and finance literature (Arin, Molchanov, and Reich, 2012). 
• We employ two alternative measures
• Percentage of seats in legislature held by left parties (Kim and 
Fording, 2002)
• Five-point scale (1 = right, 5 = left). Based on Woldendorp et al. 
(1993), supplemented by Leblang and Mukherjee (2005)
• Raw data obtained from World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions
Party Orientation Definition - Continued
• Five-point scale is defined as follows
1. Presidential system: president is ‘right’ AND controls houses with 
legislative powers. Parliamentary system: chief executive is ‘right’, 
AND government party controls more than 2/3 of the parliament.  
(Right-wing dominance)
2. Presidential system: president is ‘right’ but does NOT control 
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houses. Parliamentary system: chief executive is ‘right’ AND 
government party controls between 1/3 and 2/3 of the parliament.
3. Both systems: chief executive is ‘centrist’.
4. Presidential system: president is ‘left’ but does NOT control 
houses. Parliamentary system: chief executive is ‘left’ AND 
government party controls between 1/3 and 2/3 of the parliament.
5. Presidential system: president is ‘left’ AND controls houses. 
Parliamentary systems: chief executive is ‘left’ AND government 
party controls more than 2/3 of the parliament. (Left-wing 
dominance)
Hypothesis
• We expect firms that are more sensitive to leftist policies 
will perform worse when left parties are in power and 
enact such policies.
• More specifically, labour intensive firms, firms with high 
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gross profit margins firms with higher leverage, and firms 
emitting high quantities of pollutants are expected to 
perform worse and experience lower returns under left 
governments
Data Scope
• Annual industry-level data, 1990 – 2009, 50 countries
• Industries are aggregated  at the three-digit SIC level
• On average, in a given year, the sample contains 126 
industries
• US data obtained from COMPUSTAT/CRSP
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• International data based obtained from OSIRIS
• Control variables included:
• Log of total assets; R&D spending/Total assets; growth in sales
Dependent Variables
•Industry Value
•Measured by Tobin’s Q (market value of equity and 
assets less book value of assets over total assets). 
Source: Worldscope.
•Takes into account current performance as well as 
future growth opportunities.
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•Accounting Performance
•Measured by ROA. Source: Worldscope.
•Reflects realized performance.
•Stock Returns
•Industry value-weighted average of annual firm returns. 
Source: Datastream.
Empirical Specification
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Results: A Synopsis
SENSITIVITY
Labour Tax Interest 
Rate
Environm.
Tobin’s Q -0.101*** -0.093 -0.276* -0.013***
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MEASURE Returns -0.027*** -0.078** -0.094** -0.004*
ROA -0.017*** -0.114*** -0.099 -0.010***
How “Left” is Left?
Strictness of 
labour laws
Strictness of 
environmental 
legislation
Tax rate Real 
interest 
rate
0.031 0.016 3.038 1.122
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Left Party Orientation Index (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.12)
How “Left” is Left?
• Summary of results (policy measures EXPLAINED by 
ruling party orientation)
Durnev, Garfinkel, Molchanov 23
SENSITIVITY
Labour Tax Interest Environm.
Rate
MEASURE
Tobin’s Q -0.128*** -0.076* -0.513*** -0.052*
Returns -0.016* -0.045** -0.131*** -0.040**
ROA -0.014 -0.020*** -0.116* -0.009***
Other Results of Note
• Some sensitivity LEVELS are positively related to 
performance measures
• Tax rate sensitivity. Higher tax sensitivity, by definition, signifies 
improved performance
• Environmental sensitivity. ‘Dirtier’ industries minimize costs and 
Durnev, Garfinkel, Molchanov 24
increase value.
• Interest rate sensitivity. Highly leveraged industries outperform 
(may use debt to finance positive NPV projects)
• Effects are reversed when left governments are in power
• Sensitivities are detrimental only when they are 
conditioned on political environment
Other Results of Note
• What about stock price reactions to elections of left 
governments (presumably negative)?
• We perform event study around election dates
• When left parties win, CAR(-1,+1) = -1.36%*
• Right parties win, CAR(-1,+1) = 0.75%
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• This is consistent with our expectations
• Winning margin is defined as (% of votes in a winning 
coalition - % of votes for opposition)
• Interaction of ‘left winner’ dummy with winning margin is 
positive and significant
• Wide margin -> No surprise -> No dramatic reaction
Robustness I: Reverse Causality
• Possibility of reverse causality between party orientation 
and firm performance.
• However:
• Differences in firm performances within a country are less likely to 
affect electoral outcomes
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• Explicitly address endogeneity concerns:
1. Control for past economic performance (include a number of 
lagged economic variables)
2. Perform the analysis on sub-samples of presidential and 
parliamentary systems
3. Regress left party indicator on past economic variables and use 
fitted values in interactions
• Preliminary results indicate robustness
Robustness II: Instrumenting Political 
Environment
• Size of labour unions (left parties are more likely to be in 
power when unions are large).
• Resource (oil) endowment
• Left parties are more likely to be in power when pressure for 
redistributive policies is high
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• Country-level resource endowment should not be systematically 
related to differences in industry performance
Instrument is not weak (F-test > 10) and exogenous
Results are also robust when other resources are used as 
instruments
• Preliminary results indicate robustness
Robustness III: Interest Rate Channel
• We expect the impact of left governments to be stronger 
in countries with lower degree of central bank 
independence
• Country-years are ranked by degree of central bank 
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independence
• Analysis is performed on top and bottom quartiles
• Substantially stronger effect for country-years with low 
degree of central bank independence
Robustness IV: Multinational Corporations
• Firms have an option to shift their operations abroad 
through foreign subsidiaries
• Such a shift could be made due to political reasons
• This should work against significance of our findings
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• We calculate industry shares of foreign subsidiary sales
• Positive and significant in most specifications
• This is expected: Less pronounced effect for industries with 
relocation options
• Main results remain robust
Robustness V: Political Connections
• It could be argued that political connections, rather than 
partisanship plays a central role in determining firm 
performance
• Political connections are difficult to estimate in an 
international setting
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• We use state ownership defined as percentage of 
common shares held by the state
• Coefficient on this variable is positive in some 
specifications
• Limited support to the conjecture that state-owned firms are less 
affected by value-destroying policies
• Main results remain robust
Robustness VI: Other issues
• Firms may evade taxes
• Likely that firms with largest tax liabilities will be more actively 
engaged in tax evasion
• Explicitly account for evasion (tax rate times income minus reported 
tax liability)
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• Results remain robust
• Firms may hedge interest rate risk
• Use percentage of firms that use interest rate and exchange rate 
derivatives as an estimate of hedging activity
• Insignificant. Main results remain robust
• Relationship can be different in developed vs. emerging 
economies
• We split the sample. Results hold
CONCLUSIONS
• Despite common view of left parties being less business-
friendly, evidence of firms performing worse under left 
governments is, at best, mixed
• We contribute to the literature by
1. Introducing sensitivities to leftist policies
Addressing the fact that not all ‘leftist’ legislation is enacted by 
Durnev, Garfinkel, Molchanov 32
2.
left governments
3. Refining the definition of ‘left’
Party orientation plays a significant role in 
determining firms’ performance!
• Industries more sensitive to leftist policies perform worse 
when left parties are in power and enact such policies.
• Results are robust when endogeneity is addressed
